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Introduction.
I, This thesis as an exposition and a contrast.
5 A. The aim of this study.
This thesis aims to present critical expositions of those
principles which make up tne tneories of knowledge as found in
the philosophies of Henri Bergson and S. Alexander. Tne purpose
of these expositions is to make a comparison and a contrast which
shall express both conflict and agreement on points within theory
of knowledge. In order to arrive quickly at tnis comparison, much
that belongs to the growth of tneir ideas has been eliminated.
5 B. The plan of study.
Both Bergson and Alexander seek to solve the problem of know-
ledge which was made central for modern philosophy by Kant. Kant’s
assurance that the possibility of knowledge ougnt to precede actual
knowledge has led to numerous interpretations as to just how theory
of knowledge i^ knowledge. Rationalism, emx)iricism, and criticism
have answered from tne point of the source of knowledge. Skepti-
cism, relativism, subjectivism, logical objectivism, and logical
absolutism answer from the side of truth and certainty. Realism,
idealism, and phenomenalism rex)ly from the point of view of reality^^
Not only do Bergson and Alexander ha.ve distinct theories of
knowledge, but tney also have outstanding contributions to theory
of evolution, theory of mind, and to metaphysical theory. In regard
to them all, Bergson has expressed himself to H. Hoffding as follows,
“In my opinion, any resume of ray views would distort
them in their ensemble and, by that distortion, expose them
to a host of objections, if it's author did not at once place
himself at, and continually return to, that which I consider
the very central point of that doctrine-- the intuition of
These divisions are taken from R. Eisier, Erkenntnis-
theories . Leipzig; Barth, 1925. Zweite Auflage.
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2duration. The representation of a mult iplicit;y of reciprocal
penetration, altogether different from namerical multiplicity,
- the representation of a duration that is heterogeneous, qual-
itative, creative, - is the point vvhence I set out and to which
I constantly return. It demands a great mental effort, the rup-
ture of many restraining limits, something resembling a fresh
method of tninking ( for the immediate is far from being tnat
which is tne easiest to perceive ): but, once a man has reached
this representation and is acquainted with it in its simple form
( which must not be confounded witn its conceptual representation)
he feels constrained to change nis point of view about reality;
he sees that tne very greatest difficulties have arisen through
the philosophers' having put time and space on the same plane, / ,
and most of tneir difficulties will be lessened or else vanish."'^'
Bergson's interpretation of intuition constitutes on tne whole,
what is of essential significance in nis theory of knowledge.
A.S a contrast, S. Alexander advocates a 'naturalistic' and
analytic approach to theory of knowledge. His work is, as he des-
(2)
cribes it, " . . .
.
a plodding piece of analysis," Alexander is
within tnat group of English psycnologists wno center their atten-
tion on theory of perception. He takes a position mid-way between
the behaviorism of J. B. Watson and tne neutral monism of E. B. Holt,
This theory of knowledge is incorporated into a naturalistic meta-
physics including the plan of emergent evolution tneory.
The plan of procedure in tnis study is to bring together pojnts
of mutual interests. But extremes do not always meet. Alexander
expresses doubt on some important divisions of nis works , ^Bergson's
theory requires a new insight into every epistemological contradic-
tion. In essence, with Bergson a passion of mind breaks the circle
which binds the intellect. For Alexander, nature or reality is an
absolute order in which mind is a relation, the most interesting one
fo r us, within the total scheme of reality.
(1)
.
Quoted by J. Chevalier in his Henry Bergson. P.79, and
taken from H. Hoffding's la philosophie de Bergson
.
(2)
. S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity. P. vi.
(3)
. ibid. p. V.
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3Bergson *s Theory of Knov^ledge
I. Theory of knowledge.
{ A. The nature of consciousness.
The opening sentence in Bergson's Creative Evolution states
that "The existence of which we are most assured and wnicn we know
best is unquestionably our ovm, for of every other object we have
notions which may be considered external and superficial, wnereas
,
of ourselves, our perception is internal and profound . " ^ ^
)
Three subjects are to be noted as vital to Bergson's theory
of consciousness. The first is tne existence of internal percep-
tion as existing. This is also of primary importance, for it is the
basis upon which is built the tneory of intuition. It is also di-
rected against the view of perception as the association of molec-
ular movements of cerebral substances. There is no mind-stuff to
be considered as possible. These are negative considerations.
It is Bergson's positive contention that consciousness as pure
perception is a true psychic state. In a practical sense, conscious-
ness is in a biological relation to that part of tne universe which
is termed the environment. Psychologically, it is in relation to
that part of tne universe known as tne sense world at tne moment of
experience. The idea of intensity expresses this experience.
5 B. As we study the states of consciousness as either repre-
senting an external cause or as self-sufficient, we have (l) the
perception of intensity consisting of an estimate of a magnitude of
a cause by means of a certain quality in the effect as an "acquired
perception", or (2) we give the name of intensity to the larger or
smaller number of simple psychic states or phenomena which we con-
(l) Henri Bergson. Creative Evolution. New York: Macmillan. 1913.
p. 1.

jecture to be involved in tiie lundamental state. Tnis is no long^er
an acquired perception, but a confused perception. "TJie idea of
intensity ", says Bergson, " is thus situated at the Junction of tvo
streams, one of vhich brings us the idea of extensive magnitude from
without, while the other brings us from within, in fact from the
very depths of consciousness, the image of an inner miultiplicity
{ C. The notion as external.
In his study of the immediately given, Bergson xjlaced himself
directly in the stream; of consciousness. Everything that is not of
the nature of a pure perception may be regarded as an external no-
tion. This second subject is the gist of Bergson's theory of images.
The nature of consciousness is such trat in grasping its own states,
it does so through the mediumi of certain forms which are borrowed
fromj the external world and thus having returned to the seli what
was lent to the external world. Just what does tnis indicate? To
Bergson it means that consciousness does not exist es an independent
entity but is the existence of conscious relationships within an em-
pirical order. Then it means also that this existence is one of
psychic states seeming more or less intense. This intensity is a
purely psychic phenomienon which is miistaken for conscious movements
if measurement is attempted.
Here Bergson is dealing with the intellect's or the brain's
arrested movements. The brain transmits these arrested movements as
notions. This is externalized or symbolized movement. But it is
also of a psychic nature, being a mixed percexjtion essentially re-
lated to action. But action does not determine choice, rather,
choice is the mode of perception which prepares actions. Perception
is thus selective of those images which are external to the body also.
nr Bergson, Time and Free Will » p. 124.
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( D. The interrelation of psychic Btatee.
The third subject treats of the relation of psi^chic states.
In his earlier studies, Bergson brougnt out that tne basic mental
life is neither an abstract unit^^, nor is it a multiplicity of com-
pounded measurable states. Bergson nere is against a rationalistic
account of the *soul*, and also against any faculty psychology. Yet
there are the various states of consciousness. But there is ”...
below the self wdth well-defined states, a self in which secceeding
each other means melting into one another and forming an organic
whole.” Here we are at the heart of tne problem oi tne percep-
tion of interpreted wholes.
On Bergson description, attention to psycidc states causes us
to perceive them individually. In order to unite them, we suppose
a substantial basis, a colorless substratum, in reality only a very
artificial tning. An impassive ego and a static ego mean the same
thing. Says Bergson, "If our existence were composed of separate
things with an impossive ego to unite tnem, for us tnere would be
( o )
no duration."' ' The whole self, as every whole oi real experience
is best described in terms of self-consciousness, time, and life.
A passion for life dominates all interpretations.
'What really is perceived is tnat tne psycnical life which en-
dures and progresses, perceives also that time is just the stuff it
is made of. Consciousness makes of itself a symbolical substitute
in which the terms of succession remain outside one another. This
representation is that of time as a homogeneous Hiedium, the space
region of divisibility or measurement. It is tne realm of science
and not life itself.
111 Bergson, Time and Free Will
, p. 128.
(2) Bergson, Creative Evolution
. p. 4
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6II. Theory of intuition.
{ A. The duality of intuition.
Intuition is to be explained in its relation to intellect
and also in its contrast to intellect. As Vve move from the explanat-
ion of the physical to the vital, and from the vital to the psychical,
becoming more objective and less symbolical, we pass from intellect
to intuition. This movement of thought is a two-Vvay one, being two
different and perhaps two opposite ways of experience,
5 B. Perception and intuition.
Intuition may be deiined as an extension of perception. How-
ever, •’Perception ends by being merely an occasion for remembering. •* ^^^
There is also a real difference of our perception in nature between
pure perception and memory. •The actuality of our perception lies in
its activity, in the movements which prolong it.”^^) In terms of dur-
ation, Bergson says, "Subject and object unite in an extended percep-
tion, the subjective side of perception being tne contraction effected
by memory, and the objective reality of matter fusing with the multit-
udinous and successive vibration into which this perception can be
internally broken up."' '
Q C. Intuition and experience.
Bergson bids us seek experience at its source. Instead of
taking a bias in the direction of utility, search out wha.t is properly
human experience. "By unmaking the superficial and acquired habits,"
says, Bergson, "We may restore to intuition its original purity and
so recover contact with the real. If we drop our own peculiar con-
structions, and regain the faith and trust in our original insights,
we shall find an otiginal touch and contact with reality which is
sure and convincing. The philosophical significance of pure intuit-
ion as a matter of experience is always, whether that of externalor
of inte rnal organiza tion, that of an individual continditv
.
Cll Bergson, Matter end Memory
,
p. 71^ ibid
.
p . 74.
ibid p. 76 (4) ibid. p. 341.
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7j D. Intuition and analysis,
**By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympatriy by
v^hich one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with
what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. '*^^^As against
intuition, analysis is to express a thing as a function of some
thing other than itself, ** Analysis operates always on tne immobile,
while intuition places one in mobility or duration. "But**, says
Bergson, •‘the simple act which started the analysis and wnich con-
ceals itself behind the analysis, proceeds from the faculty quite
different from the analytical. This is, by its very definition,
intuition. ” ^There is nothing mysterious here, adds Bergson,
5 E, Metaphysical intuition.
Intuition is the apxjrehension by the mind of reality directly
as it is and not indirectly. It is not the form of perception nor
of conception nor is it an idea or object of reason. It is tne non-
intellectual grasp of events as a whole. This act is of great sim-
plicity, though the reality may be comxjlex and unique. "If a man,"
says Bergson, "is incapable of getting for himself txie intuition of
the constitutive duration of his own being, notning will give it to
him, concepts no more tnan images."
Metaphysics as a science, "....must transcend concepts in order
( 2
)
to reach intuition."' '’Whether the intuition reacnes upwards or down-
wards, v'e transcend ourselves in thought. How is this accomplished?
Metaphysical intuition is akin to the creative spirit alive in art.
It is won only after confidence or intellectual sympathy and long
fellowship with superficial manifestations. "But metaphysical intui-
tion ....obtained only through materiaL knowledge is quite otherwise
than the mere summary or synthesis of hi at knowledge. Nevertheless
Til Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics
.
p. 7.
(2) ibid. p. 89.
{?>) ibid. p. 21,

8it must be defined as integral experience ^ ^ ^
If -yi-e ask, How can intuition be objectified for purposes of
explanation, we find that intuition and discursive thought are one
in concrete reality. Any mechanism set up to explain this will
end by also controlling it. Bergson’s illustration is that of ”...
carry ourselves back in thought to those moments in our life v/hen
we made some serious decision, moments unique oi tneir kind, which
will never be repeated,-- any more than the first phase in the his-
tory of a nation v/ill ever come back Lo life.”^^^ Concrete reality
is mobility. It is tendency, ”.... if we mean by tendency an in-
cipient change of direction.” Intellect stops tnis tendency for
practical limitations. Only intuition canrreverse tne metnod of
( 4 \intellect. Tnis is to philosophize.' '
Intuition as we experience it is a union of will and feeling.
As intellectual sympathy, it enables us to' attain reality. It is
the movement between a living eternity and its material dispersion.
And in its metaphysical aspect, intuition represents tne vital im-
petus seen in creative evolution process, possessing true time.
III. Epistemological dualism,
jj A, Traditional difficulties.
It is Bergson’s contention tnat all the ordinary dualisms,
together with their theories of knowledge as found in idealism or
in materialism, think of the phenomena of perception and memory, or
the physical and the mental, as duplicates of each other. They have
a mental pole or focus and a physical pole or focus with a common
center as either a useless duplicate of an external reality or as
the inert material of an abstract intellectual construction entirely.
(l } Bergson , Introduction to Metaphysics
.
p.92.
(2) See Bergson, Time and Free Will
.
p. 237.
(3) ibid, p, 239.
( 4 ) See Bergson, Creat iv e Ev olut i on
. p, 251 and 363-3
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9disinterested. Lacking any theory of intuition or of true time,
they neglect the relation of perception to action, and memory to
conduct
.
With Bergson, epistemological dualism is recognized in that
tne reality of spiritual selfhood and the reality of matter are
both valid. This is a necessary dualism, but if correctly interpre-
ted, can be lessened if not overcome. Just as Berkeley held that
secondary qualities have as much reality as primary qualities, and
that both exist only for mind, so Bergson looks on matter from the
point of view of perception and memory as within pure knowledge.
Pure or instantaneous perception is an ideal, rarely attained.
However, perception inits concrete form is an actual experience, of
more significance than is usually recognized. '‘Every perception",
says Bergson, "fills a certain depth of duration, prolongs tne past
into the present, and thereby partakes of memory. So that if we take
perception in its concrete form, as a synthesis of pure memory and
pure perception, that is to say of mind and body, we compress witnin
its narrow limits the problem of tne union of soul and body."^^^
5 B, Some applications of Bergson's solution.
Bergson's solution is to be seen in the light of historical
dualisms. The dualistic solutions of Plato, Descartes, and Kant
were too clearly intellectual. While the religious and etnical
motives were not lacking, they sought for a too great clarity.
Bergson considers that his conception oi intuition can be applied to
the lesser dualisms of the inextended and extended, quality and
quantity, freedom and necessity.
(l) Bergson, Matte r and Memory
.
p, 32b.
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Bergson follows Kant^s method to a certain degree. But instead
of discussing paralogisms and antinomies, Bergson tries to show
that these oppositions are artificial. They are the artificial work
of the understanding and are not the given data of intuition. In the
case of the inextended and t.ae extended, tnat which is given,
that which is real, is something intermediate between divided ex-
tension and pure inextension. ^ ^ ^ The dualism is solved through what
Bergson terms, " extensive extensity
In the case of the opposition of quality and quantity, while
the opposition is less artificial, tne basis is the same. The so-
lution here is to see tnat concrete movement is capable, like con-
sciousness, of prolonging its past into the present and b^ repeating
itself, of engendering sensible qualities, already possessing some-
thing akin to sensation. In concrete perception we see the apparent
simplicity of an enormous multiplicity. The perceived difference
is only that of a rhythm of duration expressed by tne idea of tension .
The solution of the above renders the opposition of freedom
and necessity more openly for solution. In science, necessity seems
to be the ruling conception. Duration on that basis would be equi-
valent to necessity. However, both necessity and duration belong to
what is of the nature of mind. Necessity in nature is a sort of neu-
tralized and latent consciousness. This view is one oi tne central
points of Creative Evolution .
Bergson sums up these oppositions in this manner, "Spirit
borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds, and restores
them to matter in the form of movements which it nas stamped with
( 2 )its own freedom."' 'Thus a phenomenology of spirit precedes a logic,
both being ontologically prior to the manifestations in nature.
(1) Bergson, Matter and Memory , p. 326,
(2) ibid. p. 332.
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IV. Bergson’s anti-intellectualism,
5 A. As a critieism of naturalism.
One of the main criticisms of Bergson is directed against
any categorial scheme as an intellectual effort. Tnis ne claims is
an over-insistence of but one part of mind. What Bergson offers is
a critique of trie instincts in place of a study of the categories.
We are reminded by Bergson that instinct is essentially the
feeling aspect of mind as a union of -will and intellect in primitive
form. Thus biological considerations indicate tne relation of mind
to intellect. Mind is essentially creative in its freedom. This
is seen in the liberty taken when it leaves its own environment and
invades that of science. Yet, mind as understanding, is at home in
the domain of unorganized matter. Matter is determined by intelli-
gence, eyhibiting a sort of need of one for tne otner. Spirituality
and materiality (or intellectuality) have benind tnem an exchange
in which life and action are free. This is tne true realm of du-
ration and selfhood; tne world of reality.
5 B. The failure of tne categories.
Bergson has little to say about Hegel’s deduction of the
categories. Rather, he goes back to Kant lor his reconstruction.
The gist of Bergson’s criticism is tnat if Kant’s list of the cat-
egories be accepted with the theory of tne a priori nature of space
and time, it then follows tnat naturalism is to be accepted. But
how is Kant’s exposition open to tnis interpretation?
This criticism is justified because tne lundamental concepts
of physical science are proved to coincide with the properties of
the object in general. Or, witnin a more favorable but still damag-
ing interpretation, the categories, defined as tne instruments of
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of synthetic unity, exhibit a fatal incapacity to attain it. This
involves the knower in hopeless relativity and indef initeaess , It
may be concluded that the Kantian analysis simply demonstrates the
limitation ol human knowledt^e to tne partial sphere of physical life.
{ C. The intellect and life.
The categories do not apply to life, "In fact", says ^(ergson,
"we do indeed feel that not one of the categories ou our thought
.... applies exactly to the things of life.*^^)Yet we are all born
Platonists, believing tnat it is possible to catalog any new object
under concepts. But this method proves inadequate when we come to
theories of life,
Bergson substitution of instinct for categories is a new con-
sideration, But this is not the whole change which is introduced,
Bergson wishes to negate the claims of intellect. "The intellect
is characterized by the natural inability to comprenend life."^^^
By widening the base of the wnole of mind, Bergson intends to point
out the exaggerated confidence in the powers of the individual mind.
life is the activity of effort wliich remounts the tendency
tow^ards individuality, consciousness, and spirit. It is opposite
or the inverse of materiality. But life as we know it is constantly
bound to some matter, some material m^anifestation. This dualism is
inherent even in our problem of knowledge. We know intellectually
only that life which is stabilized or fixed. Life is that which
is not already made, it is creative activity, freedom.
An ontological pluralism form.s the basis upon which eniste-
ffiological dualism is fitted. This is also exemplified in the ascent
snd the descent within "nature*. The follov/ing chart illustrates
this relationship, the relation of intu ition to l ife and duration .
TT] Bergson
,
Creative Ivolution
, p. 234.
(2) Bergson, Creativ e Evolution
.
p. 174.

Evolution
as
a
whole
13
Intuition^^^
# •
The two movements of life and matter form a double relation which is
explained by the doctrine of intuition. Every interpenetration forms
a complete whole in which matter forms the skeletal part of the
created forms of duration. The duration is one aspect of the universe
identical to the "latitude of creatioh". Intuition is the art by which
one lowers or lifts himself to other levels of duration than his own.
V. Theory of knowledge and metaphysics*
D A. Intellect and space, matter, and science.
Spqce by definition is outside of us. It is wrongly interpreted
if introduced into our perception of duration. Where the self is re-
fracted into space, we have the impersonal self as a symbolical substi-
tute. The intellect is habituated to perform within this region. Logic
and geometry are at home here. But space cannot treat of the living,
of true continuity, real mobility, and reciprocal penetration. Space
and creative evolution are incompatible if considered equally important.
Matter is involved in similar limitations with space. The in-
tellect’s divisions of matter as charted above into independent bodies
with absolutely determined outlines is an artificial division. Matter
cannot be explained by particles. Analysis or elementalism in science
is the work of the intellect, a partial work of the whole mind.
In the third instance, science has not advanced beyond the Aris-
totelian account of intellect. This means that science stops short
in its theory of instinct and intuition. The intellectual molds
(1) Adapted from D.S. Robinson, An Anthology of Recent Philosophy . p. 29
New York: Crowell, 1929.
Living eternity or the level above man. (God) ? f
Our inner duration or human self-conscious-
^
ness and memory. X c
Animal life which knows by instinct. L
Vegetable life(growth and reproduction). V
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into v.riich science compresses life forms results in explanation
through categories.
{ E. Absolute and relative hnov-ledge.
fheory of knowledge must account for both intellect and intu-
ition. Yet it should not confuse them. Within theory oi knovvledge
they are explained by the difference betv-een actual acquaintance
viith experience and knowledge about it. The first is tnat of abso-
lute knowledge or intuition. Tne second is the relative way or
method of the positive sciences which use the analytic method. The
so-called ’facts* of science are not given in intuition.
In all explanations we easily and quickly get away from our
basic intuitions. We classify ’facts’ into artificial classes,
into ’events’, and objects of use. Then we create the problem of
induction. The laws of formulations between events and objects are
the ‘relations’, a still less real problem. We create symbols in
order to pigeon-hole these dry bones of facts, forgetting tne orig-
inal intuitions.
As intelligence was charged with matter and instinct with life,
we have had a dualistic epistemology. This theory leads to the meta-
physical question.
5 C. Criticism of positivism and idealism.
Scientific empiricism or positivism takes the equality of in-
telligence and matter for granted, Hume, Spencer, and others employ
the metaphysical categories of matter, force, generality, etc,, with
which they all presuppose amd apply the syllogistic form of logic.
And all the while they make use of those categories in a thoughtless
and uncritical manner. But the idealism of Fichte is likewise in
error, though a more philosophical one. Fichte’s attention to the
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order and the deduction of the categories is praisev.orthy . But
Bergson thinks that Fichte paid no more attention nor respect to
the true order of things than did Spencer. His point is that "Fichte ^1)
takes thought in a more concentrated form and expands it into reality?
Underneath these philosophies, Bergson finds tiAc convictions,
(a) that nature is one, and (b) that the function of intellect is to
embrace nature in its entirety. These ground errors are overcome in
an interpretation much less assertive andifinal. Bergson finds
the function of the whole mind necessary to do the task of philos-
ophy, to know when action takes place, when reality is being touched
and lived, and to know when work is being accomplished. The force
to labor p^nd to live are in tne very medium in which we work; it is
not the result of mechanical forces, nor is it tne end result of a
deduction of thought.
f B. The self and intuition.
What Bergson is saying is that it is necessary to make a fresh
start, a new effort, every time that we study a new object. The
essence of reality is found in interpenetrated wholes; the essence
of theory of knowledge is to account for our knowledge of them..^^^
Every object is a new object for we have no static background of
causation whcih holds each object still. Where all is duration, all
that is real must partake of durational processes, whicn is creative
evolution in its entirety. The true philosophical task then con-
sists in the search for a unique intuition from v;hich we can go with
equal ease to different concepts. This method, if successful, would
place philosophy above the divisions of the schools.
The task outlined here shall be accomplished when philosophy
(Tl Bergson, Creative Svolution
. p. 200.
(2) See Karin Costelloe, "What Bergson Means by t intempenetration*
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 15 (1912-13 ) ,131-155
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recovers possession of the simple intuition of the self ty the self.
It is true, says Bergson , ’•that to accomplish this it is necessary
to proceed by a reversal of tne usual v-ork oi the intellect ^ ^ ^
Usually vie act in order to satisfy an interest, we dissect, we class-
ify; all in order to satisfy and to know this or that. If we cut in
the natural lines of cleavage, w'e would follow the lines wnich are
presented to us in order to see what we can do with the object. This
is the case. And for the pragmatist, this is sufficient. For Bergson
it is but the application of his method to the use ol the object. The
self remains the source of this use. Pragmatism would, if accepted,
be a denial of philosophy for, '•....philosophy consists in placing
oneself w'ithin the object by an effort of intuition." )intuitionism
is a linkage of the methods of idealism and realism.
0 E. Intuition and time.
Just as tne consideration of the multiplicity of states of con-
sciousness and the unity of those states shows the need to find the
underlying self, just so do we find that a multiplicity or a unity
of forms of duration require one duration. Here Bergson passes from
a pluralism to a monismi. Yet he intends to keep nis theory open to
degrees or shades of differences in which reality is active, causa-
tional, and creative.
The issue here again is that of intuition. Bergson tells us
that intuitions are unique. They are neither multiples or compounded
states of consciousness, nor are tney synthetic unities. They are
interpenetrated wholes of experience, each one unique.
Two objects of intuition are met with most frequently. They
are selfhood and duration. Just as each self is unioue, so each
nr' Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics
.
p. 40,
(2) ibid. p. 43.
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duration is unique. For example, says Bergson, just as it is possitle
to consider triat there might be no duration otner tnan our own, so
there might be no other color in the world but orange. But as in a
spectrum, so with duration, tnere are shadings and extensions which
go in different directions. The analogy is clearer if 7,/e recall the
relation of intuition to levels of duration in whicn consciousness
reaches through qualified states into quantified states, into pure
homogeneity or pure repetition by which we define materiality. The
advance in the other direction leads through states of tension and
efforts w’hicn find themselves limited not by tne eternity of death
but by an eternity of life.
•‘This^ says Bergson, "is a living, and therefore still moving
eternity in which our own particular duration would be included as
the vibrations are in light; an eternity which would be the concen-
tration of all duration, as materiality is its dispersion. Be-
tw/een these tw'o extreme limits intuition moves, and this m.ovement
is the very essence of metaphysics."
^
VI. Concluding summary,
A number of principles can be stated of v^hion Bergson’s theory
of knowledge rests. They may be summarized as the following points,
1. There is an external reality not given immediately to the
mind. This reality is mobility or tendency as an incipient change
of direction.
2. Intellect in its attempt to grasp this mobility and in its
usual bent proceeds by solid perceptions on one hand and by stable
perceptions on the other.
3. Metaphysica l antin omies r esul t from the reconstruction
nn Bergson, Introduc t ion to Philosophy . p, 64.
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of reality by the intellect. Concepts can be extracted Irom
mobile reality, but mobile reality cannot be gotten from and with
fixed concepts. Failures in science and philosophy have been the
result of the over-confidence of the intellect to reach reality.
4. But the intellect can follow the other method. That is,
it can grasp reality by placing itself within the mobile reality
by means of intuition. This then becomes philosophy.
5. This method has yet to receive a methodical consideration.
But it is the souce of all that is the greatest in science, and
of what is permanent in metaphysics.
6. This method would begin by reconstruction within theory
of knowledge. Within this correctly interpreted dualism, intu-
itive perceptions attain the absolute. Intuition is thus non-
logical. Symbolic knowledge is the relative knowledge V/hicn pro-
ceeds from the fixed to tne moving or creative.
7. The mutable, living, and moving are more real than the
immutable and the fixed. The latter are the symoolical, but they
represent the static forms of tne real. It is the task of theory
of knowledge to represent this difference, and it is lor metaphysics
to do sway with the symbolic.
8. The great systems of Plato and Kant err in trying to pour
all possible experience into pre-existing molds. The correction
is made through the doctrine of intuition, which not only gives the
correct view of past experience, but also is the guide to future
experience
.
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S. Alexander's Theory of Knov-ledge.
lo Theori» of knov.ledge and pnilosophy.
{ A. The importance of mind.
^ In the introduction to his Space, Time and Deity, S. Alex-
ander says, that the title of his book names v^iiat is simplest in
the universe, and V(hat is, 6dr us, most comx^lex in it. The phrase
"for us" indicates from the outset the point of vie1^• -which Alex-
ander hopes to justify. He goes on to say that a very large part
of the book will be occupied -v^ith the mind as exhibited in the or-
der of realities which begin with Space-Time and which end in Deity.
|j B, Mind within idealism and within realism.
From Alexander's point of view, trie spirit of idealism is to
overestimate the mind as trie chief concern of knowledge. Likewise
it underestimates the object or thing and makes it an appendix to
mind. In the spirit of realism, "The mind is a thing whicn nas
its proper place assigned to it in the scheme of things." This
approach to epistemology enables us to ask of the nature of mind,
and secondly, to ask the epistemological question about tne know-
ledge of objects.
II. The analysis of mind and object.
5 A. The elements of the experience of togetherness
.
We are able to speak of the ontological position of mind,
for to Alexander mhnd is described as a quality of a certain sort
of nervous organization
,
in a certain condition of functioning.
^
And in order to mark out tne distinctness of mind and body as the
two partners in the knowledge relation, Alexander speaks of the mind
enjoying" itself while the object or body is contemplated.
(.1) S. Alexander, Space. Time, and Deity, p , x i i i
.
(2) Alexander follows the tninking of C. L. Morgan and G. S.
Moore in this connection.
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Lest tne distinction be regarded as clear-out, Alexander says
that there are not really two acts oi' mind, but tnere is one total
act or event. This event is consciousness as a ’‘quality” of tne
brain process. We do not have two separate and different regions
of experience eacn with its own phy siblogical basis. "In strictness,
says Alexander, "they are but an act or event witn a mental cnarac-
ter and a non-mental object of just such cnaracter as it bears on
its face.”^^^ There is the realistic contention whicn gives mind its
continuity, synthesis, and thinghood. We do not create this, but
find this to be the unity of mind, mind as represented to us by the
actual objects tneraselves.
Of tne two aspects, the notion oi enjoyment nas presented the
greater difficulty. What is new nere is the use of "enjoyed" as
a term intended to vover the wnole of tne emotional and inner life
of experiencing. To use the phraseology of C. I. Morgan, ".... The
glow of mental life witnin tne continuous process is tne suffused
( o )light of intuition, ^ enjoyment."' 'But Alexander had no intention
to use "enjoyment" in any intuitive sense. It was always identical
with the brain-process and its connections. More recently Alexander
has said, "But all I mean now by various enjoyments is brain pro-
cesses with their quality of consciousness, a quality which they do
not have unless the process is of a certain sort, which is tnerefore
intrinsic to them."''^'Tne relations between qualities, in certain
instances then, become knowledge. Alexander does not seek to de-
fend this privileged process; it need not be defended any more than
chemical, crystalline, or gravitative processes need justification.
The status of an object as based on this account is on the
_
[T] Alexander, Spac e, Time, and De i ty . I. p, 13.
(2) Morgan, C. L. Instinct and Experience
. p. 124.
(3) Alexander, Space . T ime . and Deity
.
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same level as mind. In fact, Alexander’s notion of an object viill
show that, it must nave a mental character. •’Object'* is conveniently
retained as a general name for all that is contemplated, whether it
be the partial appearance of a tning or tne thing itseli . ( ^ )There is
k
* this distinction, however. An object has a distinct existence from
the mind that contemplates it, and in tnat sense is independent of the
mind. Alexander seeks to justify tnat independence of the object as
a member of tne cognitive relation or the knowing relation.
In spite of the puzale of na.ving both tne -ing and tne -ed
pnases of experience regarded as mental, tney are botn of tne mental
order,- for purposes of knowing. But for purposes of existence, mind
and object are fellow members of this world, this Space-Time order.
Yet my mind can never be an ooject to myself in the way that a tree
or table is. **Only”
,
says Alexander, **an -in^g or an enjoyment may
exist in a blurred or subtly dissected lorm.”
{ B, The experience of togetnerness.
What then is this relation or empirical existence called con-
sciousness? Alexander says it is the experience of an enjoyed mind
and a contemplated non-mental object in one act of compresence. '•Corn-
presence* is the experience of the unity of the conscious relation.
Enjoyment, contemplation, and compresence form the total of this ex-
perience as a cognitive relation. From the empirical point of view,
this togetherness is the unified quality oi a mind-body relationship,
**But when we ask how, in the knowing relation, the togetherness is
J experi enced ,we ask the question from the point of view of the being
which has the experience, that is, of mind.**^^^
Several comments may be made here. This is a descriptivem Alexander. Space . Time, and Deity . I. p. 15.
(2) Alexander, Space, Time and Deity
. I, p. 21.
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account of knovving. Also, for Alexander there is no pure to-
getherness. That is, tnere is no experience v^rhicn is of the mind,
for the mind, and by tne mind. In every instance the mind is en-
joying the togetherness witn the object. Knov.ing is tne relation
^ from the mind side. *1 experience the string vnich unites us, as
it "were, from my own end.^^^^Tne range of this type of experience
is wide.
( A summary
.
In a summary, Alexander's tneory of compresence is a descrip-
tive account. It is not reversiole. It is a cognitive relation;
transcendental in the sense tnat a superhuman being has our own
experience as an object for his contemplation. Mind can never be
an object to itself. Introspection is not possible except as retro-
spection. Mind in its own enjoyment is a substance, of Space-Time.
Futherraore, compresence is tne most elementary of all relat-
ions. All tnat knowing as such implies is that tne compresence of
a mind and an object exists at a low level. Knowing, then, is but
the empirical form wnich consciousness assumes when one oi its
partners, having an empirical quality of consciousness, enables us
to consider lower levels of existence.
Although things are a condition for mind, tne presence of mind
is not a condition of tne existence or quality oi things. Cognition
is, then, but conation as considered in its objective reference. And
then also, wnile the compresence of the psycno-physical event is
I
obviously a spatio-temporal relation, space and time and tne so-
called categories may make a claim to belong to mind as well as to
physical things.
(TJ Alexander. Space, Time, and Deity. I. p. 21.
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III. The knowing or cognitive relation.
{ A. An anal;ytic account.
Alexander’s theory of relations is a piece of analysis. His
signal distinction is that of conation as tne experience of together-
ness. The distinction between cognition and conation is considered
valid. But conation is the more inclusive term. It is more tnan in-
stinct and less than desire. Thinking is but speculative willing.
jj E. The nature of feeling.
Alexander regards feeling as a qualification of conation. As
a mode of the cognitive process, Alexander prelers to say, "....The
mental act is conation, which is mental, and not merely physiolog-
ical, and tnen conation is simply the reference of this act to what
is non-mental, that is to tne object witnout wnich it would be mean-
ingless. '•^^^This phase of mental life is found in all existence, from
the vegetative to the physical and from tne psycnical to tne life of
God’s body. The difference lies in the Space-Time concerned.
( C. Tne nature of sensation.
Sensation contains a universal as well as a particular. Think-
ing corresponds to the universal; some percept or image, some word or
convenient symbol is tne particular. Sensations are indications of
the absence of dependence on sensory qualities or tne ’secondary’
qualities upon the mind. The mind’s sensing of a quality is a
pattern or type of enjoyed response.
5 D. ^^ualities and categories.
Tne above analysis is empirical. Yet mind as tne highest and
the most developed empirical thing we know, involves relations of
space, time causality, etc. But tnese relations are categorial
in their nature. Hence the categories come into contact, as it
(l ) Alexander. Space, Time, and Deity. II. p. 121.
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were, with the mind as bare togetherness. In order to mamntain
this distinction, Alexander considers tnese '•qualities’* as tne em-
pirical existents, and tne categories as the pervasive characters of
tne whole space-time universe.
IV. Mind, self, and personality.
Q A. Alexander's version of oenaviorism.
Alexander's account is but a little removed from benavioristic
interpretations. The steps whicn keep him from following tnat line
in its entirety are, (a) his use of quality and relation, (b) tne
consideration that mental happenings are dynamic from tne outset,
being identical with certain physical processes, (c) his theory of
enjoyment which serves to account for mental occurences, and (c) the
existence of sense which belong to tne physical ana psychic alike,
{ B. Memory, self, and time.
If objects are non-mental, that is, are physical, our processes
of conation which constitute our mental life can never oe objects of
a real self. Yet objects as processes of conation can be experienced
as enjoyments, but can never be contemplated.
How tnen can the self be known? Alexander distinguishes the
mental self from the bodily self. Memory as one phase of tne self's
existence is the memory of an object. In similar manner, the mental
self is known or remembered. The theory here is that the processes
which constitute my mental self are renewed. Remembering is desiring
backwards; it is the reverse of expectation. In a word, memory is
renewal, How tnat remembering is tne act wnereby a memory is appro-
priated by the self and recognized as my past object, we may see how
Alexander makes the transition from mental space and time to mental
Space-Time. In tne first place, mind as one of the iinites in the
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space-time order possesses, as one of its mind-ing cnaracters, vvhat
may be called retentional registration. In tne second place, we nave
memory as the state of renewa.l, always with tne underlying processes
as remembered or past enjoyments. In tne tnird place, there is a
reference to and a recognition with psychical againness. Tnis is
similar to James’s intimacy with past events. The addition of per-
sonal warmtn and tne attendant emotion are but on tne cognitive side.
What Alexander comes to is the thesis that to endeavor is to
persist. And to endeavor is to be part of Space-Time. The signific-
ance of this is (a) that we avoid tne error of supposing memory to
mean more tnan it does, and (b) it avoids tne error of supposing that
memory is in some sense present, and that it is referred to the past
through some certain indication of a subjective or personal kind.(^)
The last point indicates tne close relationship that exists be-
tween memory, self, and time. The identification ot tne place of the
mind with that of the body has been msnticned. This Is interpreted
to mean the correlation oi mental with pnysiological processes. Then
the awareness of ourselves as a union of mind ana body arises. This
union is callec a person. "Sither factor may be dominant at tinea. At
times the embodied self is considered. In other instances it is the
self which thinks, desires, imagines, wishes, and wills. “The most
developed stage of the person is the personality
,
the persistent
stable organized set of habits of thought, action, E.nd feeling, by
which I am to be judged, by which I stand or fell.... The person is in
the first case mainly a. body, in the second it is mainly something
( 2 )psychical, in the third it is something spiritual.*' 'A person is a
mind-body or space-time synthesis in which the higher self is a cor-
tinuation and expansion, and ref i nement of the bodily self
.
flT See Alexander, Space, Time, and Dei^^. p. lie
(2) ibid. I, p, lO^'
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( C. Some applications of Alexander's theory.
While Alexander has his theory of tne self, the self is hidden
under his realistic considerations. The self is ontologicall^^ im-
potent. Other factors dominate Alexander's thought. Some of these
are the following. (a) The attempt to build a theory/ of mind on a.
physical basis , ^Here Alexander is clearly with benaviorism. (b)
The theory' that the real v/orld appears directly without any inter-
vening tert ium quid . None tne less, the world Epjjesrs directly and
differently to defferent individuals and to the same individual at
different stages and phases of his development, (c) The factors that
determine how appearances shall present themselves are the bodily
conditions of the physical organism and the changes that occur with it^
(d) Sensible appearances differ from what really exists only through
the processes of "selection" and "distortion" . (2 ) But selection and
distortion are throughout conditioned by xhe body. Alexander con-
siders that attention is selection.
V. The dual account of knowledge.
5 A. The mental and the non-mental characters of the categories.
On Alexander's account there is a direct approach to the catego-
ries through theory of knowledge. But since the categories are the
characters which are carried up from level to level, and since there
are no more in mental enjoyment than in life or matter, the number of
the categories is not increased by further knowledge nor does thenum-
ber grow in the evolution of things. Knowledge and evolution have as
their offices the task of bringing out new things and distinctions
which have hitherto been unrevealed ... to mental existents.
The method of first being aware of the existence of the catego-
ries and then the subsequent imputation of the mental ciiaracter to
nj See Alexander, The Basis^of Realism, pp.9,11, 26.
(2) Alexander, Space
,
Time
,
and Deity
. II, p. 90.
.‘ *
’
«
•. LviGX-ilA Ii> *:
•'
»i* * T
<
— • .0 i-i )v;-:X rj.
-
-
'^
' j L •j -*. t ' J 1 .
0
iS. ... . rar X j.sv-.
s
.
'.<
• • ..'C
^
.
•
_
J Us* !•.. i :;:JX5/.A v\.'t,
no .» t - .;’o-- iJ . ' 0 j.i'l''* ^ -
• -
• L i »'«» . J 3 n. X .
.
.
1 i .i Toiin '
-
-
-
. *- >i
'
»')0 r r. ox'i
.
•
' 1,
'-*'
* }'li ' 1 . .:
.
i„s ' _ . •. -.W , L vn
•
„ * t ^
'
.t
’ \.t • •• .-.J 0-! hno : . ;u?>.l 'X.
'
;.-J at ^' >
'
*
'.
*
'
. j aiv.
.
., X^v..r % X>
L f ooc \ ' ' . i ! n . 'T '.i.'jii
r* Vx > ' > ,1 J bn< -oi.'-i. t ’
-
.
-nr
VJ ^ -
ft -
.,.; Oi '. I l‘ - .*.
iiT . -roLi.:.! -^.i : >•? •
ji- . 1 i . • - ^ ^ ^
I .l-ii.^x X3I»^ JO* 3-' ^'1.’ .*J‘J v- j
.t
.-.no"
.
n- ; ^ j ; -- 'J : i ix.;
£
'i .*
^
.t '! ,1 \ li i
d. a>:'nj! 'll'- -’i- yrtf.i*' : ' '
. jLijidCisy!. (b)
•^
;
• •’no.t .!a:-£?<?*’ I i^.oo': , M
j
'
',v
'
- vft'c .j 1. ..: i ^ fioi ^'1 V,- i ft
.
•'
.r )C<L‘ 'Jl jt riJ n-:) J .f ^
^ It, .' rino'jn.'i X ut' =!'.
...iw:5l£5v) - aT.i:/J-j«i6:n x.8.:aj.':-Toi u-i.; -..T . ,
.:
. V JObiij ‘ XI •; to..:! t.;0'O aO
•2r.3 -i-- -3 :X :v..
.
Xrt.) o.*: j- t . . X.j : .i^r-.ivon:i lo ;.i-.’-»ri.t xuJ 39.1'.
.
.vKi j.
,
_ _
;j L^'r- - L XJJ a:? . f* : - 'lo
.
1,1 ^-5 ni uci on y'lo
-:on-n’ ^ :o.: .or... t'i Jon a;
3'..r
I nr.JuL-V' . o ...r :o noi^oiov^ oitJ .ii
^
•.x-. i -t jni^ xi'' .IX :.! .>i;i Oito .o iaoX juJ cintli. t-w-tJ
;X. -L'lft.r. '..t . , . w o J'tsnl .in i.v^ri noxn-,
-ciioX > ^•- •'. onf'J -' .: rx: -.i^ :o a'lavi.o iix
o
I'X'til ic L-vrUt..- cjn f
^ i^
:r'xToSr'Sn” ,ia^nn:.-L‘ ss^r- ,1
. ...
- - r ,. ' > \
0 J t > 0 ^ ^ X V- no t 3r:ou..-^n.yJ^ i
.rr’^rr. rT..3XX>-'?jf'' c'of r s.; a-. ,.j:..L- 29! :
< jL J '> *
::0
27
to them is not valid. This method led to Hume*s results, and
Alexander says, '*It may he servicable anthromorphisrc, but it is
neither seience nor philosophy. What Alexander said in a previous
discussion is that **We can enjoy in ourselves, time-character and
spatiality, continuity in the iorm of substance and in the form of
causality, intensity, identity, and difference." The error of Hume
was that ".... he looked for a contemplated object where his attent-
ion had been directed towards an enjoyment; and consequently he
could find in mental action only the same sequence as he found in
contemplated objects,
For Alexander, the same continuity in space and time is found
in the mental and bodily processes. To enjoy a. category in myself
is also to contemplate it outside of me. Having Kant *3 teaching of
the a priori character of space and time, Alexander says to leave
out the mind and what Kant teaches is mainly true or sound. To leave
out the mind is supposed to avoid the miraculous element in both
Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy.
Alexander offers us a substitute. The Space-Time universe takes
the place of mind or the Absolute. Mind cannot tell us tne full tale.
{ B. The principle of categorial correlation.
It is the presence of the eternal and tne temporal in mind that
renders mind sensitive to the eternal and the transitory without. And
because mind has an organization of its own, the response of the mind
to the object takes the form of knowledge or science. So with the
^ categories. "Thus", says Alexander, "to enjoy a category in myself
is also to contemplate a category outside of me." And categorial
correlation is extended to all things. "Thus tne categories obtain
not only as between external f init es or between acts of mind, and not(IT Alexander, Space
,
Time
, and Deity
. I, 188.
(2) Alexander, Mind
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only are they enjoyed in the actual contemplation of the same cate-
gories in the external v.orld, but tney obtain as betv;een a mental
and a non-mental finite, as should be expected in accordance v<ith the
v.liole principle of exx-)lanation, which in turn is attested by direct
experience."
Thus we nave a dual role of the categories with a dual account
of knowledge. The categories, as well as tne whole of Spa,ce-Time
,
are
known by intuition, by direct experience. This is the "whole prin-
ciple of explanation". The first theory accounts for our knowledge
of metaphysical certainties, the second accounts for the organiza-
tion according to scientific principles.
0 C. Alexander’s theory of intuition.
Alexander claims his theory to be true of any experience. But
he suggests that he has only veriiiable approximations to tnose
(2)
experiences below the level of relational experience. If the -ing
and the -ed experiences are always distinguishable
,
wherein does
intuition apply?
The first case is where "knowing" is used in an "....extended
sense for the relation between any finite and tnose oi tne lower em-
pirical order,...." And by analogy, this applies to higner existents.
But Alexander realizes the directness by which other minds are
know'n. "The assurance we have of other minds was not derived from
( 4 )
analogy at all but demanded a special experience."' 'The question here
is the nature of the "mental machinery" involved.
Yet every monad has a direct awareness of Space-Time. The dis-
ability under which W'e labor is that "All our intuitions thus bear
the defects of our senses ." (^)Reflection is our remedy for this lack
of direct awarenes s . Yet, ".. .
.
all thes e variations of sens e or
(T1 Alexander, Mind
. 37 Xl9127
,
14ff.
(2) Alexander Space , Time and Deity . I, 22.
(3) ibid, p. 103.
(4} ibid, p. 205. (5) ibid. p. 201.
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intuition are but illuatra tions of v*nat arises out of the relation of
finites of any kind to one another according to their position in space
and time, and tne linitations of their organization W/hicn prescribe
ho^^ much shall be revealed to tnem and how much s/iall not. The histoiy?
of our experience of these variations of them verifies in the special
case of minds a universal rule.**^^^
5 D. Mind as a quality of finitude.
The reason that mind is significant in spite of its categorial
weakness is that it possesses an emergent quality as an emx)irical
existent. Quality is not a category, but is the differentiating ele-
ment in the constitution of the world. It is the element oi iinitude
somehow introduced into the infinite foundation of things, Alexander
does not know how to exx^lain the secret of this breaking-up of the
whole continuum into those finite centers of existence. Yet, mind is
empirical, and for us, the most empirical and higiily developed thing
we know?.
VI. The open-door doctrine of mind.
j A. An empirical account.
We may now ask, what are tne gains on Alexander's interpretations?
How has theory of knowledge been simplified and understood? And fi-
nally, what basic conelusions may be gotten for metaphysics?
From tne empirical point of view, Alexander says, "Now the effect
of the empirical method in metaphysics is seriously and persistently
to treat finite minds as one among the many i orms of finite existence,
having not privilege above tnem except such as it derives from its
(o )greater perfection of development."' 'The further question is that
of the uniqueness of the cognitive relation.
j B. As a realistic account.
From the realist ic point of view, mind is much less than it is
( 1 ) Alexander , Space , Time and PeityT II, pT 208.
(2) ibid I, p. 6.
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in any form of idealism. But Alexander intends to refute materialism
by loosing its ancient nold, and advocating a ne'w naturalism. The
unnecessary antithetical conceptions of mind and body are regarded as
signs of the underlying Space-Time unity beneatn all existents.
^ There Is a third conclusion to Alexander's doctrine. It des-
troys the notion that all spatial existents are distinguished by
being self-existent while sensations are dependent on mind. Much
rather, all qualities are dependent on mind. Extension and motion
or material substance are in tnemselves on the same immediate foot-
ing as colors and smells. These too are made up of sensa, percepts,
and exhibit the same problem of presenting their features in their
combination, ^ ^ ^This all nas a humanizing effect, enen ii it is a mere
avoidance of materialism. As Bosanquet says, '*It puts tne common
qualities we love, -- what iDractically makes up tne world we live in,
-- colour, sound, and the rest, -- on the same level of reality and
claims to existence as the shape and motion of atoms or tne facts
of gravitation.
This encouraging statement would be far reacning did not Alex-
ander stop short in his theory of knowledge, .From tne point of view;
of mind as an experiencer, mind is that new emergent quality of men-
tality or consciousness. However, wnen viewed from the subsistent
side, mind is a redistribution of sps-ce-time entities. This makes
mind a variable, a material thing, mecnanically accounted for. The
analysis or searchlight additions nowever new or mysterious tney may
h be. On the latter interpretation, mind cannot go on separated from
its physical basis. Should the extension of mind beyond the limits
of the bodily life be verified, says Alexander, the larger part of
his v;hole system would have to be modified or be abandoned.
(T) Alexander, Prop. Aristotelian Society. (1909-1910), 95.
(2) Bosano.uet, B. Distinction Between Mind and its Objec t p. 9.
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VII. Theory of knowledge and metaphysics.
5 A. Theory of knowledge as a detivative theory.
Theory of knowledge is not Alexander’s chief concern. He has
said, ’*.... I have felt something approaching irritation wnen ray first
volume which is fundamental, has been passed over with a word,,...
and exclusive attention directed to tne theory of knowledge whicn I
expressly declare to be derivative. Theory of logic does not
fall under this criticism.
For Alexander, logic is not a science of mind or oi things.
It is a subject-object science. Logic controls us in the formal na-
ture of experimental processes. But it is not directly concerned with
the empirical features of reality as it is with the categories. Logic
possesses ’’logical priority* in tnat, ’’logical grounds are more com-
prehensive than real causes, for anything which may bring disconnected
propositions into coherence may furnish truth though it may be but our
method of approaching the reality witnin which truth is constructed
as a new reality.”
5 B. Knowledge and logic.
There is a direct application of Alexander’s open-door theory
of mind and his logical theory. He intends that the laws of thought
should follow from metaphysical laws, "’The so-called laws of thought
regarded as metaphysical laws follow at once from these considerat-
ionst Here is wnere Alexander meets the material and the formal con-
siderations on the plan of Space-Time.
But tne assumption of a unified universe on tne Space-Time
pattern need be made abstract enough to encompass both tnought and the
formal laws of thought. Here is where a nexus is required, for if
Space-Time is to be brought into tne explanation of this world of
TTT Alexander, Mind, 3Q (l92l). 411.
(2) Alexander, Space . Time , and Deity . II, 272.
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time and cnange , it is supposed to yield some inlormation respecting
tne order of relations whicn it fosters and maintains. But tnis
nexus must be more tnan mind. Here Alexander ingeniously, and in some
degree empirically, adds Deity to Space-Time.
O') 0 C. Some resultant difficulties.
Through his tneory of compresence, Alexander has established
the identity of object and thought as space-Lime complexes naving the
same fundamental laws. Accordingly, he is entitled to regard the laws
of thought as metaphysical laws applying to all reality. And no per-
son can make the universe systematic if the universe does not possess
it itself the corresponding nature to be regarded as systematic. As
Bosanquet points out, "But no world can be synthetic in itself, that
is, can possess universals as a part of our nature if its elements
nave not, pervading tnem, the living nisus and endeavours towards a
whole which indicates participation in tne nature of minds.
A second difficulty is the assumption of Space-Time as tne "stuffs
of the universe. Hook’s criticism applies here. If categorial
features are analytically discriminated characters, the vague con-
tinuum which is pegged at the outset, cannot be one of tnose catego-
ries. It follows tnerefore that Being is not a category and Exper-
ience is not a category. Neither is Space-Time not subsistence nor
any other denotative indication of the sum of actual and possible
( o ) ( )
existents,"' ' Alexander’s Space-Time is "neutral or bare being".' ^
Tne dilemma wnich Alexander creates for niraself is tnis. In his
^ first volume, tne burden of a working relationsnip is on tne shoulders
of Space-Time. Here the restlessness of Space-Time is no adequate
account for the potentiality wnicn nis emergent world of quality re-
quires. In the second volume, the burden of emergence, perfection,
or development is on the qualities as they emerge. This emer,-^,ence
(1) Bosanquet, B. Distinction Between Mind and its Object .p .35.
(2) Hook, S. The Metaphysics of Pragmatism o. 116.
(3) Alexander, Space, Time, and DEITY 1,201.
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is to be taken on ’animal faitn or ’natural piety’; the T^vhole
scheme is supposed to exemplify tne nisus tov-ards Deity, Tne first
may be called an absolutistic dispensation, vvhile tne second is a
relativistic one.
Thus tne final scheme is a divided one. His limiting analysis
of mind fathers the dilemma involved in the Space-Time unity, Alex-
ander has tnereby separated tne categories and universals from tne
qualities and the experiences of mind. Then ne has sought for the
logically prior in an ontological substance vnich is barren of actu-
ality, creativity, purposiveness and true evolution.
The reason, tnen, tnat tneory of knov.ledge is but a derivitive
is that Space-Time is taken to be an experienced wnole. “It is
clear". Says Alexander, "that Space-Time takes ior us tne place of
wnat is called tne Absolute in idealistic systems, All finites
as Bradley’s appearances are completely incomplete. But tneir ab-
sorption into the wnole of Space-Time does not destroy their rela-
tive reality. The explanation lies in tne catet^ory oi relation.
5 D. The avoidance of tne epistemological issue.
Ratner than an epistemology, Alexander advocates a metaphysical
metnod of procedure. This metnod avoids tne strictly epistemological
issue in several vays. In tne lirst place, it excludes the prin-
ciple tnat other tnings depend on mind. Tnings owe their perception
to mind, but not tneir nature. "All attempts to make metaphysics
into epistemology means unduly exalting tne fact oi knowing, which
however important is but one kind oi relation in the world among
(
2
)
others, are therefore condemned,"' 'The relation of knowing is not
unique. Yet it is tne most elementary of all relations, and it is a
relation of knowinpi only when one member is a mind, A second
(IT) Alexander. Space. Time and Deity. I, p. 346.
(2) Alexander, Mind . 39 ( 1912 ) , p. 319.
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consideration is tne exclusion oi tne x-'i’ii^ciple tiiat .7jind is co-
extensive 'vvitn x-^dysical things, if not v\,itn life. Not ever^tning is
a mind. In fact, the object is not dexjendent on tjie mind.^^^A tneory
of relation takes tne place of an epistemology, A tnird consider-
ation is that in tninking v^nicn involves ideal emements, judging
gives to the ideal predicate tne same order of dignity as tne subject
possesses.'* In all v^ays of knovi/ing, thinking, or relating, mind and
( ^ )body are one. "We tnus enjoy in tninking our ovn causality."
j E, Tne unity of Space-Time.
It is the unity of Space-Time ratner tiian tnat of mind wnicn is
of interest and significance to Alexander. Or in Alexander’s ovn
words, "It is the contrast of tne categorial and empirical cnarac-
( 2
)
ters which is of tne greater importance i or metapny sics . " ' 'That is,
Space-Time does not exist. But tne qualities are tne empirical tnings
wnich arose out of tne a Mriori features of all existences. Alex-
ander nas then the task of fitting t^ie theory of emergent evolution
upon a non-emergent structure or ground.
In brief, we have tne plan of tne a priori elements of exper-
ience or tne categorial scneme. This is an outgrow tn of tne solution
of tne mind-body problem. Then we mve an account of the existents.
Here tne order of development is lurnisned by tne relation oi mind
and body. A tnird point is tne account of tne metapnysical contrast.
In this contrast, mind and knowledge play a dual role. Alexander
is forced into a dilemma from wnich nis system cannot be freed.
In order to illustrate tnis whole scheme of Alexander’s, the
following chert or plan is given. To label tnis, " a piece of
plodding analysis", scarcely <3oes_credit_to_ tne_v^2 prphpmp
(1) Alexander, Space
.
Tim e
.
and Beity
. II, pT 105.
(2) Alexander, Mind 37 (l912), 327 f.
(3) Alexander, Space
.
Time
.
and Deity
. I, p. 254.
rc
fi F. The Scheme of Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity
The theory of Emergent
Evolution applies to all
within this pyramid.
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of life. This level is stated in
terms of physVco-nhysical processes.
Here we find "^e "secondary" qual-
ities such as ftolor, shape, etc.
This is the stagA of the material
"qualities" . The \ "primary" qual-
ities are the empiricau modes as cate-
gories, such as size, shape, number,
and motion of various sorts.
Motion is the border-line between the categorial and empimcal.
This is the realm of the aategories. The categories of finite
things are not applicable to the ground of finite things, that is to
Space-Time. The categories are the "categorial characters" and are
distinguished from the "empirical characters" or "qualities" . They
are the ground work of all empirical reality, comparable to Plato’s
highest kinds of being.
The categories illustrate the connection of the non-emnirical and
the empirical. The least empirical group consists of existence, uni-
versality, relation, and order. The middle group de’^end on relation
and are substance, quantity, number, causality, reciprocity, intensity,
whole and part. The last or third group is motion. It gives the to-
tality of what can be affirmed of every space-time.
Quality and change are not categories. Motion can be affirmed
of every space-time, hence Motion metaphysically considered is
SPACE-TIME .
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VIII. A Eummari?
.
1. Perceptions are non-mental realities and the. only mental
reality is an acto of mind. The term " compresence" indicates tne
double aspect of enjoyment and contemplation.
2. The act of perceiving and tne object of tne act of perception
are both external to the mind. Yet tnis act oi perceiving is a mental
fact and, categorially , the form of tnat act denotes tne attitude
or direction of that vhich knov.s tov^ards tnat vvhicn is knov.n.
3. Knowledge is a relation in whicn perception is tne conipjeesence
or togetnerness of tne object perceived witn tiie niind as perceiving.
4. Conception is the compresence of the object perceived with
tne mind in the act of thinking, the judging act is tne act of judg-
ing, the memory act is tne act oi remembering, etc.
5. Alexander’s tneory leads to and implies tiiat the knowing re-
lation is one of absolute simplicity, the simxjlest and i or us
,
the
most interesting of all relations, in a word, togetnerness.
6. When two tnings are together and one oi tnem is a mind acting
in a way appropriate to tne otner, it is aware of tnat otner. The
state of the mind is biologically described as enjoyment, w-hile the
object is said to be contemplated.
7. Knowledge as the relational experience always possesses this
double aspect. Yet monads possess direct awareness or intuition of
Space-Time
,
a. In tne widest sense, anytning may be said by an extension
of the word, ’know*, to know any otner with which it is together.
Tnis and nothing more tnan this is, i or us, knowledge.
9. Yet mind is a special case wnich verifies a universal rule.
The principle exemplified is tnat of universal correlation.
10. But tneory of knov<ledge is derivitive to Alexander, His use
of logical priority is an avoidance of the epis temfLogical issue.
i(
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Part Pour
A Comparison oi Bergson’s and Alexander’s Theories.
I, Theory of knowledge and x>hilosophy,
{ A, Bergson’s point of view irom witriin.
Bergson places himself within the whole mind from whicn to
consider knowledge. He has recovered tiriat ’innocence of the eye’
by w,nich original reality is presented for epistemological inquiry.
Bergson does not take tne position of naturalism, nor is he an ab-
solute idealist. Professor Flewelling has aptly called him a
Personalistic Realist.
Naturalism for Bergson, ignores the creative nature of mind,
while absolute idealism ignores tne determinism involved. The
dynamic intercourse of a true interactionism requires a new method,
that of intuition. Theory of knowledge is both a study of tne
immediate data of consciousness as given by this new method, end
is a. criticism of knowledge itself. Accordingly, theory of know-
ledge and metaphysics are similar,
0 B. Alexander’s point of view as without.
S. Alexander holds tnat tneory of knowledge is out a chapter
( 2 )
of metaphysics, "
. .
,
of wnich it takes its stride,” ^The reason for
this account is tnat mind takes its plaice as an empirical ”quality”
alongside of all emergents that fall within the scheme of emergent
evolution, ’Nature* has become enricned and complicated, in time
reaching the crucial state in which, for us, tnings benave like
minds. Knowing in a limxited sense is tne most interesting relation
between such a mind and any object. In miind, tnen
,
we have a
special case iromi which we get a general rule oi relations.
II. Knowledge and consciousness.
{a, Bergson’s tneory of consciousness.
(1) Flew'^lling, R. T. Bergson and Personal Realism.
(2) Alexander, Space
.
Time , and Deity
. p. xITIT
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Bergson divides trie vhole of consciousness into instinct,
intellect, and intuition. Knowledge as tJrie iunctioning of tne
intellect is less able to gras^j reality/ tnan is intuition. ¥fet
the labor of intellectual efiort must have been done previous to
intuition. Also, intellect is less able to grasp life than is
instinct. •In realit;y**, says Bergson, intellect and instinct
accompany each other only because tney are comxjlementary
,
and they are complementary only because tney are different, what
is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent
in intelligence
^
Intellect is pragmatically important in tne field of action.
In social life and in matters of practice, tnere v.e i irid tne dia-
lectic of intellect. Action is the instrument of consciousness . ^ ^
^
Consciousness is defined, as an arithmetical difference
between potentiality and real activity. It measures tne interval
between i epresentation and act i on. ^ ^ ^ 1 1 is synonymous w-ith inven-
tion and with freedom.
Knowledge, tnen, a.s within the whole mind begins with per-
ception and goes on to intuition. Alone in man has this advance
been made.
{ B. Alexander’s theory of consciousness.
Alexander considers consciousness as tne conational aspect
of a knowing relation. It begins with the enjoying and contempla-
ted experiences which are compresent as an event or act of mind.
If there were twp acts of mind, parallelism would be true. But
parallelism is only a psychological convenience, and does not ex-
p.ress tne r eal rela t ionsnip. Nor is animism, as an alternative to
( 1 ) Bergson, Creative Evolution , p. 1437
(2) See Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 189.
(3) Bergson, Creative Evolution
, p. 152.
(t
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the theory of interactionisra, accurate. Alexander interprets in-
terac tionism from the naturalistic point of vie’A, - the only ques-
tion at issue being tiiat of the neural mecnanism.
Yet mind involves the relations of time, sx^ace, causality, etc.
^ The unity of tne mind relation represents a causal connection Tfthich
futhermore signifies a categorial reciprocity.
III. Tneory of images and objects.
jj A. Bergson’s tneory.
Bergson considers that ixnages are not iormed by tiiought.
They are the reflected experiences of tne self in v-hich are opposed
the data of consciousness in a manner appropriate for the dialectic
of reason.
Objects are otner tnan images. Objects or things are neces-
sary for the work of the intellect. But tnere is no object for wnich
there is an innate idea. Rather, tnere are things and there are re-
lations. Whatever, in instinct and intelligence, is innate
knovcledge, bears in tne first case on tnings and in the second on
relations ^ ^
)
Intelligence naturally fixes on objects, and yet it
falsifies them if taey are considered as tne static forms oi life.
5 E. Alexander’s theory.
Images are in some sense physical, being the enjoyed space-
time filled vvith mental events Vvhich are always psycho-physical
.
The cause may be the compresent object or it may be some xxrecedent
mental act or some physical stimulant. With an image plus the
y attendent memory there is the sense of xjast experience as ^ past.
Objects are finite existents which are revealed to tne mind
in any act of mind. Any spatial-temporal contour is a thing. Two
compresent physical finites make, ior us. a thin^:.
( 1 ) Bergson, Creative Sv~^ution. p. 156.
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IV. Knowledge and memory.
0 A. Bergson’s theory.
Bergson separates real memory from secondary memory. Real
memory is an immediate data of the self. It is t.ie immediate appre-
hension of past exxjeriences wnioh are taken for tne movement or
direction whicn indicates future events. Memory completes present
experiences, by adding to tne past, and in turn, represents and
dreams the future.
Ordinarily, memory is associated with space and time on
the same basis. This is a mistake, for time and memory are absolute
experiences while space is relative to mind. The error is a natural
one, for secondary memory is the psycho-physical representation of
true memory.
In true memory we nave the union of spirituality and materiality
and wnen this union is concentrated in our personality, we find tne
edge making incisions into tne future,
Q B. Alexander's theory.
Alexander correlates the memory of objects with t/xe self 's
apprehension of experiences tnat are past. Remembering is tii.e re-
instatement of ourselves in the apprehension of experience as past,
or in otner words, in compresence with past objects.
"The images of things are appearances of tnings
^
The
standard here is our sensory experience. Memory is always pale, and
unstable, and unfaithful. The only unique thing about memory is the
possibility that it may anticipate sensory experience.
V. Intuition and interpenetration.
11
A. Bergson’s theory.
Intellect ".... as tne mecnanism of our ordinar.y knov.ledt-:e is of
(1] See Bergson, Creative Svolution
.
p. 212.
(2) Alexander, Space . Time . and Deity . II, p. 213,
..o r
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a cinematograpnical kind.** Sucii a series is alv^a^s ol separate thought
pictures, eacn one inert and static. But x-'^'^cess, vital experience,
self, and duration cannot be photograpned tnougnt and cannot be
intellectually conceived. But tnese realities have a meaning and re-
fer to life and consciousness which really exist.
It is through intuition, then, that we are aware of process
itself. Intuition completes tne whole of knowledge tneory.
If there is process other tnan tnat of wnicii we are immediately
aware as er live it, we must somehow xout ourselves in it by an act
of sympathy. But since w'e are ourselves vital and conscious agents
we can only sympathize witn other vital and conscious agents. Hence
all process is of tne vital and conscious order, and even tne order
of the inert is only a static product precipitated from tne dynamic
stream of life.^^^
Dialectic is tne relaxation of intuition whicn enables in-
tellect to break ux) its own uniqueness into concepts and so be pro-
pagated to other men. Dialectic, tnen, is necessary for it puts
intuition to the test. It makes lor agreements, tnougn tnere is
only one truth. Were It possible to maintain intuition, philosophers
would agree, for then tneir agreements vc uld be generalized and
objectified.
But what is of more significance x-^j^ilosopnically is tne mutual
interpenetra tion of the multiplicity of conscious states and tne ab-
stract unity which form tne continuity at tne base oi tne self. The
explanation of tnis interpenetration is central to the doctrine of
intuition
.
This interpenetration is also of vital importance in that, witn
True continuity, real mobility and reciprocal penetration form that
(T] See Morgan, C. I. Instinct and Experience, p. 131.
... Si i . .. i5:)i»[/. ^ ;jij‘
,
S'* L.
^
; :.' iv^ - . ;- ’U Jt.:j:iI '-*•>
3 Jori:.^ j t '::i Ji
,
aw.iJ ^.u
.
.'i'^cxc Atj v
v
i: 1 ; ,* •_
'.'
'i;
'
' 1 J i-x
'
' J*
'
.
'
. ^leTjriOn
,
.I..'>’i.:'
.
'
-•• ii..---' .b-T ' • : • : .
.
,
LD It'll - . - •« J -I ( . ' ,. r.J. fOi..,1 -i . .
.
^'io.-4kj • he.L v'?::.- to U 3 :tt: Xv, t.- > .'r i .* f •• J . !
^i. - j.v . .j.- L- aatvX a-juJo .j fi ^ o .
.e ..‘i lU ^•.>v'.La.'T;;r.
<
*
^-*. . I ;/ .\o- L'.‘_.' : o i;': •. ni . Jijr. A'-
. .Mt?:- .iOjLJ -i-.wb T. 'Jxv 'i . . . . / ‘-i3,xuJii:.i.vX'v,3 ..xnc, h>^/
-
. .J ...I/ . . ’
t
I v:. . i . ') aiiua< Irfi'. -• .-r^viv ic' ax n9X};yu',t‘.|
• ii.J 10 1 .... J •i/-) 1'.‘ ^ 0 '. ' I J bOl
^
DiJfrJ ': 'Olno JT[d:u 9 _t^ ,
.
• ii i G ji ; 'T : a
-•
. i 'i' J 9 i 1 9 X • • ' .• *. U «. ' • j il 1 to n* ij.ivifjlc'-. di.J .] » J GGXiiG
’
1 :
«
' 5 Xn.l r:.. G; U'.L ''. J i - 'ic : J V J - L:.^J
n •• .
.
'iT t loXiX « • N.' oj ij _ J
Jii »> il • * 1 - '•*:£ ; .1 ' G a i .: r.
- 5
'*• Jljjj.ii. , . • ; ri 1 .?.f. 0 ^ G Xi* im', J |i 5)1 -x'-’ • •' -’f . ::no
r G -
1
tiv ; _' * _
'
J
''-*•*< ki'i £' -I n-.' .. G-io- TGv^nX
,
t C* 0^'
. -.
i 1. L .*.111
.
i
-•
-l . . i’. • .Ui -".
ji.J . -' 'Js;;'-.;-x a . ioi L;i i 9.:J Xo .t-*' i.
a
;*!: j .'-i
iilT .I-.":: IL iiiJ-’ 34..J b*:J .01*..
1 ; ;.ri-iJoob :::.t cj cl ;. . i .J ,^'i
-
ni L.i n. : i
4.Xx.'
,
ni lciX it It ;. >. cX.-^i .xifiT
J -.*.t j-t.'- : T ; _i? G '- r 1 '2 :.v; I !. r ::c r. I s:> : t ' J-'’ '.-.-‘G aX I
T
• - ^ . G.-.n^ -Tr.G 2 '' n r' .r TT)
' 9
\
T
42
creative evolution which is life.^^^ Continuity or duration imply
at once tne multiplicity of elements and the interpenetration
of the all in all.
One of tne reasons that feeling plays so large a part in Bergson’
theory of intuition is that feeling in its various forms of sympa-
thy and antipathy is closely interpenetrated with intelligence. In
fact, living intuitions instead of represented intuitions are seen
in the feeling aspect of intuition.
Intuition may bring both intellect and instinct to recognize
that life does not quite go into tne category of the many not into
tnat of the one; a sufficient interpretation of tne vital process.
Interpenetration is tne bringing together of tnese factors whicn
may be termed tne structure of intuition.
One of the consequences of this theory is tnat the more we see
the interpenetration of our progress, the more we need and use the
data of intuition, personality and duration, action and freedom.
This is a reversed psychology, the opposite to elementalism in psy-
chology, hut is it true pnilosophy. As Bergson says, •• Conscious-
ness is distinct from tne organ it animates, although it must under-
( 2 )go its vicissitudes.**' '
Q B. Alexander’s tneory of intuition.
Bergson’s doctrine of intuition had its rise in the correction
of the Kantian limitation of mind and the a priori cnaracter of time.
Alexander's use of enjoyment came through his consideration of cau-
sality.
But there is also the relation of causality and substance.
(1) See Bergson, Creative Evolution , p. 170.
(2) ibid. p. 284.
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’‘Causality is notning more tnan tnis iundamental relation betvveen
substances . ^ ^ ^This relation like otner relations is based on the
mind-tody relation.
^ut this metaphorical use of ’mind* has its limits wnen Space-
Time is reached for tnere v.e nave no longer a relation, but a Hy-
phenated unit or Motion. Here is an outstanding instance of like
meeting like. The mind enjoys itaelf categorially in contemplating
tne corresponding categorial ieatures of tne object vnicn it con-
(
2
)templates. Here tne term ’avvareness* ai.>plies.' ‘
Intuition as awareness is a. form simpler tiian sensation, yet
anterior to sensation and is different from reason. “ . . . . Hut
reason and sense are outgrowths from it, empirical determinations
of it o’* ^ ^ ^ Intuit ion is not more direct tnan sensation or tnought
,
the only difference is in the relation of objects which are thus
brought together.
There are several instances in wnich intuition is most aptly
given. The first is that of tne coincidence of tne enjoyment of
the date togetner with tne duration of a mental event and tne con-
templation of tne external time togetner witn tne duration of the
object. A second instance is an extension of tne first in tnat
Space-Time and tne categories are intuited. However in botn cases
mind is tne same. As Alexander says, "Our mind is always sub-
stantial even in a single act, and it is also substantial as a whole.*'
So far Alexander has found intuition as the apprenension of
an existent and a subsistent. Iftnet tnen of appearances? Appear-
ances are ’*.... not objects of sense at all, but of intuition
^
^ ^
(ir Alexander, Space . Time, and Deity . I. F.284.
(2) See II, p. 144.
^3 Ibid. II. p. 147.
(4) ioid. II. p. Ibl.
(5) ibid. II. p. 192.
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I
But Alexander also says, v^e ai^x-^rehend sx^atial cxxaracters by
intuition. **^^^That is, Alexander saves nimseli from contradiction by
iioldin;^ that we intuite only primary qualities, not in any form of
themselves, but as related to tne secondary qualities. Intuitions
are affected by whatever affects tne perception. Tnis is txie price
we pay for having our intuitions of Space and Time aroused by sense.
Curiously enough, Alexander does not say tnat we nave an in-
tuition of Deity. The ’‘religious sense” is distinct, crude and
primitive in comparison with the reflective definition of religion
( 2 )
as faith in deity seen in the line of value.
The reason here is that sensation and faitn alike depend on the
compresence of objects. Tnere is not apprexiension aistinct
from our conations, but only objects whicn are apprenended txirougn
( 3 )
our response to tnem as cognita .
”
The explanation of the relation of mind and mind applies to
the relation of mind and deity. We are assured of tne existence of
otner minds through the social emotion, and oi deity tnrough the
religious emotion, following James's interpretation, Alexander
extends James’s tneory of tne subconscious and ados that we as parts
of Sxoece-Time in its forward tendency act on tne bodily organism
and that tne religious sentiment is tne feeling lor this whole.
VI. Theory of knowledge and tneory of self.
5 A. Bergson’s tneory.
Bergson makes a clear distinction between txxe reel self and
the self' of action. Tne immediate data of our ex^jerience, time, free-
dom, and our own intuition depend on tne self. Tney are tx'ie objects
of a pluralistic reality. On tnis account, tne self is a unity in
multiplicity. ”1 am.... a unity tiiet is multiple and a miul tipi icity
that is one; but unity and multiplicity are only views taken by an
(1) Alexander, Space . Time . and Deity . II, p. 200.”
(2) ibid, II, p. 41 G.
(3) ibid, II, p. 380.
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understanding tnat directs its categories st me; I enter neitner
into one nor into tiie otner nor into botix at once, altnougn botii
united may give a fair imitation of tne mutual interpenetration and
continuity tnat I find at tne base of my ovn lif e . * ^ ^Sucn is my
inner life and sucn also is life in general,
Tne self, then, is a unique unity; it is not a category bnt
is the source and means of categorial discriminations. The self is
intuited. Yet tne self is constantly cnanging, i or an ego vmicn
doss not change does not endure. The intuition of tne self alone
finds tne true inv.ard and living unity oi selfhood.
5 E. Alexander’s theory.
Alexander considers tnat tne bodily self and. tne m.ental self
occupy tne same space- time. The sell is an organism, and kno’*iedge
of tnat organism is best described in biological lasnion. It is a
union of mind and body, sometimes the body predominates and sometimies
the subject or mental factor is predominant.
There is no actual interpenetration such as Bergson has in mind.
But all that nas taken place v.here tne self ’’overflows into" cer-
tain objects is tnat an extension of tne bod^' nas taken place Y.nere
( 2 )the body does not usually go." The bodily self is thus the be-
ginning and type of all forms of personality, and we ma^ return to
tne question of tne experience in v.hicn tne self as subject and body
come to be api^renended as unified in a whole or person which is rr:ore
than a mere aggregate. This unity which is more tiiuan an aggregate
is first tne direct identification of tne place oi tne mind and body.
They are one thing exx^erientially . Then we find tnat the miind in
time and the mind in space are identical. Tne reason for this is
the basic space-time of w ni cn_mind is a cru c ial instance.
TlT” Bergson, Great j-ge Evolution
. p. 272.
(2) ibid, p. 106.
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But the mental sell is capable of rei inements and expansions.
Tnere is the further development of personality out of tne embod-
ied self in vnich the spiritual emerges out of tne psychical. Here
ve find mind playing the part of the emergent lorce in vhicn causal
^ overlapx^ing takes x-'l^ice en route to Deity o Tne conjunctive side of
emergence is to oe taxen on trust, on natural jjiety.
Kind, then, plays a double part in Alexander’s pnilosopny. In
the first place, it is a space-time configuration. In tne second,
it is the emergent cause, similar to Bergson’s vital process.
VII. Theory of knowledge and theory of science.
jj A. Bergson’s theory.
Mind is more knovable than nature vvnere xno'wledge and intuition
are together necessary to tne knowing process. However, to Bergson
knowledge is associated with tne intellectual processes whose fail-
ures in science are more conscious tnan its successes. The reason
here is tnat tne intellect gains only a clear idea of tne discon-
tinuous and tne relative.
’’Positive science is.... a work of tne intellect .” (l )Tne pit-
fall open to tne philosoxjher who follows this method of science is
tnat he is led from physics to an inert metaphysics of matter. Such
a philosox^ner accepts tne doctrine of tne simi:)le unity of knowledge
and the abstract unity of nature, ending either in a metaphysical
dogmatism or in a mepaphysical skepticism.
It is true tnat understanding is at nomie in tne domain of un-
ll
organised matter, and tnat on this matter human action is exercised,
but this does not give us tne clue to tne nature of m.ind. Mind nas
its commerce with its organism, out it only to give to science a new
method.
^
This is tne method of the attainment of in tuit i on whi cn
(l7 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 216.
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transcends tne symbolic or scientific. '
5 B. Alexander tneory of science.
For Alexander, nature is more xno'viable tnan is mind for in
nature 7;e iind tne simpler relations exemplifying tiie same cate-
^ gorial scheme which dominates all existents. Mind is knov.able,
but onl^ in tne sense and degree txiat nature is first knowable.
Bergson tried to bridge tne gulf left oy tne Kantian sepa-
ration of mind and nature by reinvestigating tne nature of mind
and by discovering that mind overflows tne intellect. Fur tiiermore
,
mind has tne same absolute existence as nas duration. Alexander
tries to bridge tnis same difficulty by reinterpreting nature on
the plan of space- time. ‘Mature' is txxe existence of any occu-
pation of space-time. There is not antitnesis to nature lor in
Alexander's system there is the categorial structure and its em-
pirical existents.
Mor is nature the Bergsonian inversion of tne movement which
created tne intellectuality of mind and tne materiality of matter.
Rather, nature is the process ana tne process-ing
,
and tne process-
-ed. In otner words, A.lexander's wnole pnilosopny is a naturalism.
The full tale of the fundamental determiinat ions is told in motion.
And motion is consequently the totality of wnat can be affirmed
of every space-time.
'Motion' takes the place of the Absolute, or more correctly
it takes the place of Spinoza's 'substance', although Alexander
^ inverts Spinoza's system. Substance as 'nature' is mioticn or Space-
Time .
VIII. Knowledge and causality.
{ A. Ber/Jjson's tneory.
lY] Bergson
,
Creative Evolution
, p. 209.
(2) See Alexander, Space , Time . and Deity . II, pi. 323.
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For Bergson, knowledge and causality as a mechanical category
are together lacking in metaphysical import. Causality as a post-
ulate for tneory of knowledge nas no metaphysical justification as
it is an intellectual sym.bol.
Also causality as possessing a double indication of procession
and conversion is the end of the natural movement of the intellect.
This is the work of the cinematographical tendency of per-
ception and thought. Cur perception and tnougnt begin by substi-
tuting for tne continuity of evolutionary cnange a series oi un-
ciiangeable forms ^ ^ ^
Following this static method of modern phiiosopny, ”our the-
ory of knowledge turns almost entirely on tne cuestion of laws:
genera are left to miake snift as best tiiey can. The reason for this
bent in our method is that modern philosophy nas tne point of de-
parture in the great astronomical and physical aiscoveries oi modern
times. The laws of Kepler and of Galileo have remained for us the
( o)
ideal and unic.ue type of all knowledge.*^' '
The confusion in modern relativism is tnat laws do not treat
of the vital order whicn is essentially creation. Laws treat only
of tilings and betw^een facts. At least one oi our knowledge
deals with living genera, independent terms, wnicn beer on the *
tning-in-itself **
,
the very reality. ’•Essence’* and '•accident'*
need to be united in intuition and creative evolution.
0 E. Alexander.
Knowledge ^ a causal relation. But any relation expresses
the causal category. The reason for this is that •*.... substance
is a system of motions and whether the cause is a substance ot a
nr Bergson, Creative Evolution
.
p. 544.
(2) ibid. p. 241.
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motion is all one. A cause is tne motion of a substance, or a
substance in respect of its motion ^ ^Tnere need not be for tne
causal relation any other substance tnan tne motion, adds Ale^fander.
But is not the instance of the experience of the future in
^ enjoyment e contradiction of this definition? Is not this antici-
pation of the future causal? The error of tnese questions is that
Tfte attribute to the future what is enjoyed as present, where we
should take Time seriously and neYer determine tne future oy tne
actual present. '*It may be determined by the future as future,
but this forms no exception to tne proposition ^ ^
^
Causality is tnen the relation between substances in virtue
of their overlapping. The issue is as to tne alteration which
takes place in the pre-existing motion of the second substance.
Mind is only a case of tnis over-lapping, but it is not causal
in any unique sense. Knowledge exists wnere tnere is any together-
ness or compresence, and in a narrow sense wnere there is a causal
relation between mind and object. Tnis after all is a purely des-
criptive account and in no case is the overlapping a causal or
creative one. The cnaracter of the reaction depends on the nature
of tne body affected, and on tne effect produced by tne cause. But
remote effects do not limit tnis relation, however complex.
IX. Knowledge and evolution.
Evolution with Bergson and with Alexander is a tiieory whicn
applies to the nature of being. "Vitn Bergson, tne relation is di-
ll rect; witn Alexander it is only half the story.
{ A. Bergson.
Theory of knowledge is significant in tna t it affords a.
~(l ) Alexander. Space , Time , end Deity . I, p. 230.
(2) ibid, p. 230.
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means of explaining hov; theory' of knowledge can api^ly to two very
different aspects of reality. Philosophical trutn is not a syn-
thesis of particular sciences to be thought oi on tne level of
sense, nor is it the intsrpireta tion of them in a logic, nor is it
^ tne carrying of tne results of the sciences to a higner degree of
generality. If such were the case, tnen there would be two kinds
of knowledge, one as science, tne otner :.pnilosophy. To solve this
separation, Bergson links up nis tneorj of evolution to tne ex-
perience of interpenetration. Both are mutual exi^eriences
,
in
theorv of knowledge gained only by intuit ion . ^ ^
^
Bergson strays, as it were, into all realms of life, picks
out what seems vital in eacn realm, and unifies them under a cur-
rent of existing life with its ox)posing current of fixation. This
survey of the evolution of life suggests to us a certain conception
of knowledge, and also a metaphysics
,
whicn imply eacn otner. Once
made clear, this metaphysics and this critique may throw some light
in their turn, on evolution as a wnole.^^^
In this explanation, *The main question of tne tneory of
knowledge is to know now science is possible, tuat is to say,
in effect, why there is order and not disorder in tilings. Any
pyramidal scneme with a vital order at tne summit, with the geo-
metrical order as a diminution, or a lower complication of it, and
witn a base consisting of tne essence of order or incoherence, is
a purely intellectual scneme. If disorder or inconerence is not
|| to be a mere word, tnen there is not first tne inconei eiit
,
then the geometrical
,
then tne vital: tnere is only the fgeometrical
(1) See Bergson, ’*!’ intuitive philosophique . * Rev. et M.
(1911) 809-329.
(2) Bergson, Creative Evolution
,
p. 195,
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P.nd tne yital, and then a swaying of the mind between them, the
idea of the incoherent
^
'^Dialect ic and intuition are the two part-
ners in tne whole of knowledge as dependent on consciousness or
mind. But this is not to be considered as accomplished by a single
^ stroke of mental effort, nor is it the whole of a material thing.
Extension and tension, dialectic and intuition, direct movement
and inverted movement express tne knowing of a reality which
is makin,-!: itself in a realit.y whicn is ummaking itself . ^ ^ The
center of this movement is not a thing , but is a ^continuity of
shooting out'*, or God.
From a point of view of knowledge as a wnole, Bergson is
pluralistic as regards nature, dualistic as regards man, and mon-
istic as regards tne world order or God. Intuition nas yielded
this conclusion in which, **.... all tne living nold togetner, and
all yield to tne same tremendious push, fhe animal takes its
stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and txie whole of nu-
manity, in space and time, is one imrriense armp galloping beside,
and before, and behind each of us in an overwnelming charge able
to beat down every resistance and clear tne ir.ost formidable ob-
( 3 )
stacles, perhaps even death.**
5 B. Alexander’s theory.
For Alexander, tneory of knowledge applies only to naif of
his philospphy. It covers tne realm of the emergent existents on
tne plan of compresence, Tne doctrine of emergence applies to
the relation between any two types of determined space-time exist-
ents, 7/hat is distinctive here as against tne Bergsonian interpre-
tion is that a process governed by one type of emergence may
m Bergson, Creative Evolution, u, 249 .
52) ibid. p. 261 .
(3) ibid. p. 286.
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apparently "be produced by or be analyzed into a process governed
by the other.
The dynamic relation of our mind to the living organism which
it occupies is but an outstanding instance of a relation whic>i can
be appropriately expressed on any level of emergence.
Yet the existence of emergence admits no explanation . ^ ^ ^The
candid investigator accepts emergence with the compulsion of fact»
as a matter of empirical evidence. But ’’The important question is
wnetner.... in the case of mind and its cnaracter of a conscious
being*, it must be conceived as discontinuous witn a neural struc-
ture or a neural mechanism.
Alexander goes on to show how on his tnecry there is no dis-
continuity between mind and body. '’If, as I have suggested mental
process is also neural there is no discontinuity ( I mean disconnec-
tion ) between those neural processes and processes occuring at lower
levels of the nervous system or even of the organism taken as a whole
Then Alexander goes on to explain how there is connection between
mind and a larger whole which is not all of it conscious . ^Yet this
connection is not entirely conscious,
Alexander’s solution oi this connection rested, first on nis
analysis of mind, tnen on his definition of substance, and lastly on
his account of causality. Yet his empirical connections are not
merely juxtapositions but are in the end true connections, for he
has postulated a connected categorial structure, not entirely con-
scious ,
The * . . .
.
fetal contradiction between tne two strains of ab-
solutism and relativism. ...**, *^ ^remains uncorrected in Alexander’s
(IT) Alexander
,
Space
.
Time and Deity . II, p. 47,
(2) ibid. II, p, 22.
(3) ibid, vi (footnote).
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system. The doctrine of emergence applies only to the realm of
the relative existents of vhich mind is tne crucial instance. Ab-
solutism applies to the realm of tne cate,_,ories
,
in vhich mind has
no place except by analogy. Mind as an emergent existent is fit-
ly apprenended on a biological account, on tne likeness oi vital
reactions. But Space-Time is intuited, and tne categories are in-
tuited. Yet Deity is not intuited. Consequently
,
theory of know*-
ledge suffers the same division tnat Alexander’s metapnysics has
suffered. Tnis account of knov^ledge applies alike to freedom,
values, and the like
\ \ r
’.'"X-V
io 0)X»DT lej^si oJ 'c-i-*^ Htii.l‘^^ ani'tiDoi' s'h^
-^A .eo<ti?i;8nZaX©ipjna ^xiar rii nxttin lo 1^^^^ s»TlJflIt>'x aAJ
>f;a bnivu iv.ixr.^v yi '^aax'io edfiio to ai,'Wn A.'.^ .iKi asiiv:.^
.7 *
’
*
•, 7 .;V
.
'.
,.
‘
^
-Jil rti rLa* zb bail( . v:5c'X^(i» Sqeoxh i>o»tq oa
rto ,^^^tJOO;oa XijxZ^oXoi'o a bwbndris'E.iqw yl
i,, • „ , R‘
'
,
,
, X
-ftl o'fe 0a'i'Tja'dtf:o;:^ iTw 6.na . enciMoaa.'i
.b0j-i« 3 nt ,'ort ai .fte4-tv^
-;onA 10 ^i*
ajpn z^^'lhiEy^in. 3'-i.c»/ji4?x$XA m^icVUt s^iliuo
,{30bMT>i.0^. S2>fo£?Hiro;u'*fo ^^itico. ^ti:!P ,fo£ivTt;>»<
•4
’
'' n ^:‘ ^ .
•'•
^
*{' '':
. ?iil :=»i;J titiR
,
Ute'^
t'
’
’
,
•
.
*"
;S
.#*'••
'
•;'ir
y
a.
Conclusion.
I. Modern tendencies.
Both Bergson and Alexander are v.itnin tne present tendency in
epistemological tneory which seeks to show now our various experience
are to be considered as existing and interpenetrating. Tney also
aim to indicate now tne contents of these various experiences are
snared. This whole attitude taken towards epistemology is a modern
one, indicative of one of our ways oi thinking.
Within this newer way of thinking, Bergson and Alexander are
deeply concerned with method, tne correct metnod of interpenetration.
Bergson thinks that his method of intuition is but an extension end
an appraisal of a method always significant, but not as yet made
centre! in philosophy, Alexander finds that the scheme of his system
is related to older cosmologies, but ne utilizes newer psycholog-
ical tendencies within his theory of knowledge.
Then the issue of tbe nature of consciousness occux^ies the
larger attention, if no more tnan to indicate solutions to otner
philosophical problems. The nature of tne conjunction of mind and
body or tneir mutual overlapj^^ing constitutes either the key to tne-
ory of reality, or else is a test case for a. universal ap^-lication
of theory of relations.
Where Bergson depends on the background of his exposition of
life, time, and mind in order to make tne transitions from sensa-
tion to perception, and from perception to intuition, Alexander
rests his transitions on a glorified behavioristic interpretation
of tne relation of mind and body,
II, Tne contents of theory of knowledge.
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The expositions of tne t^AO tneories gave the substance for
a comparison in which tne applications of epistemological theory
were fitted to what seems central in philosophical knowledge. Here,
if Bergson was correctly interpreted, t.^e metnod of intuition left
fewer issues unclarified and miore insignts made. Similarly, with
Alexander, an appreciation of tne ‘empirical’ or scientific method
gave us what probably is, on nis postulate of Space-Time, a final
c.nd njost comjpletely worked out system. Tolerance, eagerness to
include possible deviations and to grant tne way open where in-
clusion seems impossible, characterize tne two writers.
III. Kn ow 1 edge and metaphysics.
Another cnaracterist ic of the two thinkers considered is
the necessity of mjetax^j^^ysical incuiry which either completes or
verifies the epistemology presented, or else tnrovs light on tneory
of knowledge. Theory of knowledge is thereby acknowledged incom-
plete fromi the point of view' of a whole philosophy. Witn Bergson,
reality snares our struggles and nas interwoven in its nature the
same irreducible opposites which we experience. Yet this opi^osition
is broken in two ways, one in a mionism of practise, end tne otner
by tne presence of a God wno is in and yet not of this strife of
things. With Alexander, tne universe of emergents and their uni-
formity is sucn tnat we are able to investigate it. It just so
happens that our knowledge or our logic does lock-step with tne
existent world. But our knowledge of the real world of Space-Tim.e
^
and the categories is paid for by tne price of being sensatory.
Alexander has tnis necessity of saying tnat Space-Time is in-
tuited, but intuition is no more direct tnan tne senses are direct.
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Eergson as an epistemological dualist adds intuition to
reason and instinct, self to lesser self, freedom to rnecnanical
necessity, duration to measurable time, and creative evolution to
formalism in evolution theory. Alexander breaxs an absolutism
into a duality of substance v;nich in turn fields the multiplicity
of this existent Vvorld on the plan of emergent evolution. In or-
der to do this, he added intuition to reason, metaphors and iorm-
ulae to postulates and assum.ptions
.
IV. Time.
Alexander acknowledges Bergson's vindication of time as
a problem for philosoxjhy. Both “take time seriously". Yet
their epistemological oppositions could be stated in term.s re-
specting that problem. This present study might be considered
PS a prolegomenon tow^ards a study of the pjroblemi of time.
V. The idea of God.
In brief, Bergson builds on the philosopn^ of Leioniz
,
but without the inclusion of tne notion of 'substance'. Here
Alexander seized on Spinoza's doctrine of 'Substance', but in
an inverted fashion. With both Bergson and Alexander, tne old
question of eternity becomes translated into tiie question of the
meaning of time. Bergson chamipions the idea of a creative God,
one possessing absolute duration. Tne epis temjological device
of Alexander's idea of God consists in reconstructing God v^ith
fragments of tiie evolved ernergents.
V
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